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Appellee, Pleasant Grove City, hereby respectfully submits the following 
Errata to the Brief of Appellee. The purpose of this Errata is to inform the Court of an 
incomplete citation to the Affidavit of Lieutenant Jim Taufer, made on pages 7, 35, and 
36 of the Brief of Appellee. These pages do cite to an Affidavit of Lieutenant Jim 
Taufer, but there are two different Affidavits of Lieutenant Jim Taufer in the record. 
The proper citation should include a reference to both Affidavits. 
Pages 7, 35, and 36 of the Appellee Brief cite to an Affidavit of 
Lieutenant Jim Taufer found at pages 241 to 243 of the record. See [R. 241-243]. 
However, a more complete citation should include a reference, or direct citation of, the 
Affidavit of Lieutenant Jim Taufer found at pages 215 to 217 of the record. See [R. 
215-217]. 
For the Court's convenience, a corrected page 7, 35, and 36, indicating the 
appropriate citation to the Affidavits of Lieutenant Jim Taufer, is included herewith as 
Exhibit A. 
DATED this Z V of February, 2006. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By "2^ 5 O. AJ^lcy^^ 
PETER STIRBA 
MEB W. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Appellee Pleasant Grove City 
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I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Zfj^y o f February, 2006,1 caused to be 
served a true copy of ERRATA TO THE BRIEF OF APPELLEE by the method 
indicated below, to the following: 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Kristopher S. Kaufman 
TOMSIC & PECK 
136 East South Temple 
Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
tf U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid () Hand Delivered 
() Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Bret Hicken 
Pleasant Grove City Attorney's Office 
70 South 100 East 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
M U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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EXHIBIT A 
were still fabricating in there weren't you? 
A: We were doing a prototype. 
[R. 355-356]. 
7. On November 21, 2001, after determining that Mr. Orvis was operating a 
major home occupation at his residence, Lt. Taufer issued the citations to Mr. Orvis 
which now form the basis for this prosecution. Lt. Taufer stated "that Victor Orvis was 
operating an unlicensed business in Pleasant Grove in the years 1999-2001 and was doing 
so at the time of my visit to his home on September 24, 2001." [R. 215-17 and R. 243]. 
8. Pleasant Grove's Zoning Administrator, Mr. Ray Limb, cannot recall any 
other individual who, after being warned for operating a business without a license, filed 
a minor home occupation permit application and then was caught operating as a major 
home occupation business without a license. [R. 231]. 
9. Between 1999 and 2003, the City of Pleasant Grove initiated at least 
twenty-four criminal prosecutions against individuals for operating businesses within the 
city without a business license. [R. 322-44]. 
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as described in Finding 4. [R. 355]. 
Finding No. 6 is admitted by Mr. Orvis. [R. 355]. 
Finding No. 7 is admitted by Mr. Taufer, but is irrelevant to selective 
enforcement. [R. 215-17 and R.243]. 
Fmding No. 8 is admitted by Mr. Taufer, but is irrelevant to selective 
enforcement. [R. 215-17 andR. 243]. 
Finding No. 9 is admitted by Mr. Taufer, but is irrelevant to selective 
enforcement. [R. 215-17 and R. 243]. 
Finding No. 10 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 215-17 and R. 243 affidavit 
of Jim Taufer generally]. 
Finding No. 11 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 215-17 and R. 243 affidavit 
of Jim Taufer generally]. 
Finding No. 12 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 215-17 and R. 243 affidavit 
of Jim Taufer generally]. 
Finding No. 13 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 215-17 and R. 243 affidavit 
of Jim Taufer generally]. 
Finding No. 14 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 215-17 and R. 243 affidavit 
of Jim Taufer generally]. 
Fmding No. 15 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 215-17 and R. 243 affidavit 
of Jim Taufer generally]. 
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Finding No. 16 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 215-17 and R. 243 affidavit 
of Jim Taufer generally]. This finding is also evidenced in each of the findings made 
above. 
Clearly each of the above findings of fact is supported by the record that 
was before Judge Maetani, and that is before this Court on appeal. Furthermore, given 
these factual findings, it was wholly appropriate for Judge Maetani to make the 
conclusions of law which he did. That includes finding that Mr. Orvis was not subject to 
selective prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the City respectfully requests that this Court 
dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
In the alternative, the City respectfully requests that this Court affirm Judge 
Maetani's denial of Mr. Orvis' Motion to Dismiss based on selective enforcement 
(prosecution) and affirm the guilty verdict rendered against Mr. Orvis. 
DATED this day of February, 2006. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
PETER STIRBA 
MEB W. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Pleasant Grove City 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to this Court's December 29, 2005 ruling, this Court has 
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Pleasant Grove Municipal 
Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) as that chapter was allegedly applied to Mr. Orvis. 
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APPELLATE ISSUES 
A. Whether Mr. Orvis did in fact raise the issue of selective enforcement of Pleasant 
Grove Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) at the Justice Court level as is 
necessary to confer jurisdiction on this Court. 
B. Whether a defense in a criminal action which alleges the deprivation of one's 
constitutional rights based on the decision of a prosecutor to selectively enforce an 
otherwise constitutional ordinance or statute is actually a challenge to the "validity 
or constitutionality" of that ordinance or statute. 
C. Whether Judge Maetani applied the wrong legal standard to Mr. Orvis5 defense of 
selective enforcement or selective prosecution. 
D. Whether it was error for Judge Maetani to conclude that Mr. Orvis was not the 
subject of selective enforcement under either federal or state law. 
E. Whether Judge Maetani's Findings of Facts are subject to appellate review, and if 
so, were they: 
1. Contradictory to Judge Maetani's legal conclusions, 
2. Supportive of Judge Maetani's legal conclusions, and 
3. Made in error. 
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CITATION AND RECITATION TO PLEASANT GROVE MUNICIPAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5.04 § 030 (2000), THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH IS 
ALLEGEDLY AT ISSUE. 
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, partnership, group or association to 
engage in any business, trade, profession or calling within the corporate limits of the city, 
without first obtaining a business license as hereinafter provided, or to violate any 
provision or fail to comply with all of the appropriate provisions of this Chapter, and any 
violation or failure to comply with any provision of this Chapter shall be punishable as a 
class B misdemeanor and a civil fine may be assessed in 1he amount of twice the 
applicable license fee as provided by the ordinances of the city. 
Pleasant Grove Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) (amended as Pleasant Grove 
Municipal Code Section 3-1-3: LICENSES REQUIRED in 2003) (the "Ordinance"). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Orvis' statement of the case is mostly accurate. Pleasant Grove City 
would however delineate that Judge Maetani was fully and thoroughly briefed on the 
issue of selective enforcement prior to his decision denying Mr. Orvis' Motion to 
Dismiss for "selective enforcement." 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In order to obtain a Pleasant Grove business license for businesses 
operating in a residence, the businesses must obtain a "home occupation permit." There 
are two categories of home occupation permits under the City's ordinances, "minor" and 
"major." The definition of a minor home occupation business is very limited with 
respect to the activities that can be performed and encompasses businesses such as 
traditional home offices, beauty parlors and the like. Major home permits allow a 
somewhat greater range of activities and require a conditional use permit from the 
Planning Commission. [R. 363-364]. 
2. In approximately 1997, Mr. Orvis began operating a metal fabrication 
business called Design Fabricators, Inc., in Pleasant Grove City. [R.360; R. 394-95]; 
Appellant's Brief at 6. 
3. Despite operating a business in Pleasant Grove for approximately four 
years, Mr. Orvis admits that he did not apply for a city business license of any kind until 
August 23, 2001. On that date, Mr. Orvis submitted a business license application in 
-5-
which he requested a "minor" home occupation permit for his business. [R. 356-57; R. 
140] 
4. Mr. Orvis' minor home occupation permit application, which was signed 
under penalty of perjury, falsely described his metal fabricating business as a "home 
office/' [R. 140]. 
5. At the time he filed his August 2001 minor home occupation application, 
Mr. Orvis knew that he was not operating a minor home occupation business, but rather a 
major home occupation business. As he testified at his deposition: 
Q:[MR. STIRB A] Isn't it true that as of August of 2001, the 
business activity for Design Fabricators was a major home 
occupation business? 
A: [MR. ORVIS] The type of activity could be construed as a 
major home occupation. 
Q: That's true, isn't it, as of August of 2001? 
A: Yes, I'd say that's probably true. 
[R. 353-54]. 
6. Mr. Orvis continued to operate as a major home occupation business even 
after he applied for the minor home occupation permit and was doing so on the day Lt. 
Taufer visited his residence: 
Q: Didn't say anything about the shop in the [August 
2001 minor home occupation] application, did you? 
A: Did not. 
* * * 
Q: When [Ray Limb and Lt. Jim Taufer] showed up in 
September of 2001, and Officer Taufer saw the shop, you 
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were still fabricating in there weren't you? 
A: We were doing a prototype. 
[R. 355-356]. 
7. On November 21, 2001, after determining that Mr. Orvis was operating a 
major home occupation at his residence, Lt. Taufer issued the citations to Mr. Orvis 
which now form the basis for this prosecution. Lt. Taufer stated "that Victor Orvis was 
operating an unlicensed business in Pleasant Grove in the years 1999-2001 and was 
doing so at the time of my visit to his home on September 24, 2001." [R. 243]. 
8. Pleasant Grove's Zoning Administrator, Mr. Ray Limb, cannot recall any 
other individual who, after being warned for operating a business without a license, filed 
a minor home occupation permit application and then was caught operating as a major 
home occupation business without a license. [R. 231]. 
9. Between 1999 and 2003, the City of Pleasant Grove initiated at least 
twenty-four criminal prosecutions against individuals for operating businesses within the 
city without a business license. [R. 322-44]. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The City will first respectfully reassert that this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal. Although Mr. Orvis states in his docketing statement that he is 
appealing the constitutionality of an ordinance "as applied" to him, that is not the case. 
First, in order for this Court to have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the 
constitutional issue being raised on appeal must have been raised in the justice court 
proceeding. See State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304, 305 (Ut. App. 1990) (holding that 
because appellant "had not raised in the justice court the issue of the validity or 
constitutionality of the ordinance under which he was charged, this court's dismissal of 
his appeal from the circuit court judgment for lack of jurisdiction was proper."). Here, 
the issue of selective enforcement or prosecution was not raised in the justice court. 
Second, in this case the issue is not one of whether the Ordinance was 
constitutional "as applied" to Mr. Orvis. No argument is ever made that the Ordinance is 
unconstitutional. Rather, the issue is whether the decision to enforce or prosecute Mr. 
Orvis under an otherwise constitutional statue was proper. The constitutional questions, 
if any, revolves around public officials' discretion, not that of the constitutionality of the 
Ordinance "as applied" to Mr. Orvis. 
In the event this Court is unpersuaded by the jurisdictional argument, then 
the City will argue that Mr. Orvis was not the victim of either selective enforcement or 
selective prosecution. Mr. Orvis alleges a criminal defense to his prosecution and thus, 
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selective prosecution applies. This is not a civil action. Accordingly, Judge Maetani 
applied the proper legal standard of selective prosecution. Furthermore, Mr. Orvis 
cannot make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution because the facts clearly 
indicate that he was not singled out, or treated disparately in any manner. Rather, the 
facts indicate that the city enforced a valid and constitutional Ordinance against a 
longstanding and flagrant violator of that Ordinance, in Mr. Orvis. Accordingly, the City 
did not enforce the Ordinance with any discriminatory effect or purpose. Thus, there was 
no selective enforcement. 
Finally, Judge Maetani was reasoned and accurate in making his findings 
of fact, and thus, this Court should not disturb those findings and the conclusion of law 
which rely upon them. Given these arguments, the City respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the decision of Judge Maetani to deny Mr. Orvis' Motion to Dismiss based 
on Selective Enforcement (Prosecution) and affirm the guilty verdict against Mr. Orvis. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Orvis Did Not Raise the Issue of Selective Enforcement of Pleasant 
Grove Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) at the Justice Court Level 
and Thus, this Court Lacks Jurisdiction. 
Pleasant Grove City (the "City") filed a Motion for Summary Disposition 
which this Court denied, granting deference to Mr. Orvis' docketing statement which 
"indicates that he is appealing the constitutionality of an ordinance as applied to him." 
November 29, 2005 Order. A matter of jurisdictional deficiency can be raised at any 
time in an appellate proceeding. Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91 at \ 15 (holding that 
questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time because such 
issues determine whether a court has authority to address the merits of a particular case); 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (holding that the initial 
inquiry of a court is to determine its own jurisdiction). 
Accordingly, the City will reassert that this Court lacks jurisdiction. "Utah 
case law clearly provides that neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from proceedings in the district court held pursuant to an 
appeal from the justice court unless the issues raised in the justice court involve the 
validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or statute." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 
276 (Ut. App. 1998) (emphasis added); see also South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 2002 
UT App 405 at % 3 (recognizing that the case had been heard in injustice court where 
"Defendants argued the City violated their due process rights when it altered its 
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interpretation of the ordinance . . . . " ) . 
In order for this Court to have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the 
constitutional issue being raised on appeal must have been raised in the justice court 
proceeding. See State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304, 305 (Ut. App. 1990) (holding that 
because appellant "had not raised in the justice court the issue of the validity or 
constitutionality of the ordinance under which he was charged, this court's dismissal of 
his appeal from the circuit court judgment for lack of jurisdiction was proper."). The 
City acknowledges that Mr. Orvis filed a Motion to Dismiss for selective enforcement at 
the district court level, however no constitutional argument attacking a City ordinance 
was made at the justice court. Appellant's brief presents no argument or evidence that 
the selective enforcement of Pleasant Grove Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) 
was raised or argued by Mr. Orvis in the justice court proceedings. Accordingly, 
pursuant to the clear and precise case law from this Court, the City respectfully argues 
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
II. Mr. Orvis' Motion to Dismiss Alleged the Deprivation of His Constitutional 
Rights Based on the Decision of a Prosecutor to Selectively Enforce an 
Otherwise Constitutional City Ordinance. It Did Not Challenge the 
"Validity or Constitutionality" of Pleasant Grove Municipal Code Chapter 
5.04 § 030 (2000). 
In this case, Judge Maetani held as a conclusion of law that Mr. Orvis was 
not "the victim of a selective prosecution in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's 
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Motion to Dismiss And Motion to Suppress at page 4 of 8; [R. 390-92]. The issue 
addressed at the district court, was that of prosecutorial discretion to enforce an 
otherwise constitutional ordinance. Mr. Orvis has never argued or intimated that the City 
ordinance under which he was charged was unconstitutional. Rather, he alleges that the 
prosecutor's decision to enforce or prosecute him was unconstitutional. The district 
court determined that the prosecutorial decision to prosecute Mr. Orvis was 
constitutional. The district court did not rule on the constitutionality or validity of 
Pleasant Grove Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) "as applied" to Mr. Orvis. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-120(7) states that when a justice court 
decision is appealed to a district court,1 "the decision of the district court is final and may 
not be appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or 
'Justice court decisions arise in criminal proceedings. Thus, the probable purpose 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7) is to discourage the conviction of the citizens of Utah 
under unconstitutional statutes and ordinances. Here, however, there is no challenge to 
the constitutionality of the ordinance under which Mr. Orvis was charged. It is a 
constitutional ordinance. Rather, the defense of Mr. Orvis attacks only the decision to 
prosecute. 
In essence, Mr. Orvis attempts to allege a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for the 
unconstitutional "state action" of selective enforcement of an otherwise constitutional 
statute in this state criminal proceeding. Mr. Orvis does not allege "selective 
prosecution" in this appeal. In fact, a corollary reason for this appeal is that Mr. Orvis 
lost his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal court when the Honorable Judge Ted Stewart, 
being fully briefed on the law and apprised of the facts, and having fully reviewed Judge 
Maetani's Findings of Fact, decided it would be appropriate to adopt those Findings of 
Fact res judicata. See Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Denying Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss (attached at "Exh. A."). 
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ordinance." See State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273 (Ut. App. 1998) (holding that "absent an 
issue regarding the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, the decision of the district 
court is final and this court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal thereof."). 
In this case, there is not an "as applied" challenge as Appellant alleges, 
because no unconstitutional statute or ordinance, or unknown interpretation thereof, was 
"applied" to Mr. Orvis. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
properly addresses why there is no "as applied" challenge in a "selective enforcement" 
case: 
"Selective enforcement" is not, of course, a First Amendment cause of 
action; rather, as the Second Circuit has aptly observed, it lies in "a murky 
corner of equal protection law." LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 
(2d Cir. 1980). To prevail on a claim of selective enforcement in this 
circuit, a plaintiff must show that he was singled out from others similarly 
situated or that his prosecution was improperly motivated. The critical 
inquiry in such cases is thus not whether legislation is constitutional 
"as applied" to a particular set of facts, but rather whether the 
government may constitutionally "apply" the same rule to some individuals 
but not to others similarly situated. 
Of course, a [civil] plaintiff may prevail on a "selective enforcement" claim 
by showing that the government's motive in selectively prosecuting him 
was to prevent or paralyze the exercise of his constitutional rights. In some 
cases, this may involve determining whether plaintiff was in fact 
attempting to exercise constitutionally protected rights, including First 
Amendment rights. This inquiry, however, remains subordinate to the 
question of the government's motivation; it does not transform an 
equal protection "selective enforcement" claim into a First 
Amendment "as-applied" challenge. 
Sanjour v. E.P.A., 56 F.3d 85 n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal marks omitted and emphasis 
added). 
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Accordingly, while the Appellant's Docketing Statement may indicate that 
he is appealing the district court's ruling on the constitutionality of an ordinance "as 
applied" to him; he is in fact appealing only a ruling on the constitutionality of the 
"government's motivation" in prosecuting him under an otherwise constitutional statute. 
Furthermore, while Mr. Orvis attempts to rely on South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 2002 
UT App 405, that case is not determinative to Mr. Orvis' case. 
For example, in Terkelson, the determinative issue was not one of 
"selective enforcement," rather it was one of whether "the City violated their due process 
rights when it changed its interpretation of the law without providing notice."2 Id. at n. 
3. Also, unlike Mr. Orvis' case, the defendants in Terkelson claimed that the ordinance 
was void for vagueness or for over-breadth in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at n. 
4. The Terkelson court explicitly recognized that "Defendants proffered testimony in an 
attempt to prove that the City had altered its interpretation of the ordinance without 
2In this case the sole allegedly constitutional argument is "selective enforcement." 
However, selective enforcement is not a constitutional question because a government 
official's decision to apply a constitutional statute to a citizen is not a constitutional 
violation. See United States v. Brookshire, 514 F.2d 786, 788-89 (10th Cir. 1975) ( 
holding that "[selective enforcement is not in itself a constitutional violation."); 
Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1091 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that "mere selective 
enforcement of a law is not unconstitutional."); Rindley v. Gallagher, 929 F.2d 1552, 
1555 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that challenge was to statutes selective enforcement, 
not its constitutionality); Baltimore Gas andElec. Co. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408, 1419 (41 
Cir. 1985) (holding that mere decision of an "agency to enforce the law against an 
individual cannot support a claim of selective enforcement in an independent action 
challenging only the constitutionality of the statute.") 
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providing Defendants notice, but the trial court refused to admit this testimony." Id. at f 
8. Accordingly, in Terkelson there was a ruling on the constitutionality of the ordinance 
because evidence of an unknown and arbitrary interpretation of an ordinance was not 
considered. 
Here, there is no such argument, evidence, or facts. Here, there was no 
ruling on either the constitutionality of the ordinance, nor the interpretation of the 
ordinance. In other words, there is no evidence that the interpretation of Pleasant Grove 
Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) ever changed. The sole argument here is that 
a constitutional ordinance was enforced only against Mr. Orvis (although it was 
admittedly applied to numerous others after Mr. Orvis [R. 322-344; Addendum Tab. 2]). 
Thus, under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7), this 
Court lacks jurisdiction because Mr. Orvis is not appealing a district court ruling "on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." 
III. Judge Maetani Applied the Correct Legal Standard in Analyzing What He 
Correctly Perceived as a Constitutional Defense of Selective Prosecution 
(Although Termed "Selective Enforcement") in this Criminal Prosecution, 
Mr. Orvis claims in this appeal that Judge Maetani applied the wrong legal 
standard in determining that Mr. Orvis was not subjected to "selective enforcement." 
However, "selective enforcement" is a challenge to the actions of officials in determining 
against whom to enforce the laws, and is not per se unconstitutional. Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501 (1962) (holding that "the conscious exercise of some 
-15-
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation."); see U.S, v. 
Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that "[tjhough selective enforcement 
, if based on improper motives, can violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection, 
selective enforcement in and of itself is not a constitutional violation."). 
It would have been error to apply the "irrational and wholly arbitrary or 
based on animus or ill-will" standard for selective enforcement, when the constitutional 
defense is based on selective prosecution. See Appellant's Brief at 35.3 Furthermore, as 
will be explained below, the standard for selective enforcement cited by Mr. Orvis is 
more properly applied in civil actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In fact, the 
Supreme Court has explained that a claimant alleging selective prosecution of facially 
neutral criminal laws must demonstrate that the challenged law enforcement practice 
"had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the proper standard is not whether the decision to 
enforce or prosecute was "irrational or wholly arbitrary or based on animus or ill-will," 
but rather whether there was both a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. 
3
 Some courts do not even differentiate between these standards, and apply only 
the selective prosecution standard. See Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio State 
Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 534-35 (6th Cir.2002) (selective enforcement claims are 
governed by the same analysis as selective prosecution claims); LeClair v. Saunder, 627 
F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that "appellees' charge boils down to one of 
selective enforcement or prosecution by a state official pursuant to a lawful state 
regulation."). 
-16-
The standard which must be applied in this case is that of the standard for a 
challenge to "selective prosecution." This is a criminal defendant's challenge to the 
prosecutorial decision of whether or not to charge the defendant. Accordingly, a 
constitutional defense in a criminal prosecution, like that at issue here, must necessarily 
be one of selective prosecution. After all, the issue is whether the prosecutor has violated 
Mr. Orvis' constitutional rights by bringing the prosecution, and whether such 
prosecution should be dismissed.4 
Accordingly, the proper standard is that applicable to selective 
prosecutions, not selective enforcement. Mr. Orvis cites a litany of cases in his 
Appellant's Brief which he purports stand for the "animus or ill-will" standard which Mr. 
Orvis claims Judge Maetani should have applied. However, none of these cases involve 
a criminal prosecution, and all involve civil actions. See Village ofWillowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (U.S. 2000) (alleging that village's demand for 
33-foot easement in order to connect property to municipal water supply violated equal 
protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Wojcik v. Massachusetts State Lottery 
Com% 300 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (asserting claims under § 1983 and Massachusetts 
4The City would again respectfully note that this constitutional issue in no way 
attacks the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance or statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-5-120(7) (requiring that the district court rule on the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction of a criminal case originating 
in the justice court). Rather, it attacks only the constitutionality of the prosecutor's 
decision to prosecute Mr. Orvis under a constitutional ordinance. 
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Civil Rights Act and claims for defamation, tortious interference with contractual 
relations, invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium); Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93 
(2nd Cir. 2001) (claiming that the destruction of inmate's mail violated his rights to due 
process, equal protection, and access to the courts); Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 
385 F.3d 274 (C.A.3 (3rd Cir. 2004) (section 1983 civil action challenging decision to 
deny development); Tri County Paving, Inc. V. Ashe County, 281 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 
2002) (section 1983 civil action challenging denial of permit); Boone v. Spurgess, 385 
F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2004) (civil action against enforcing police officers); Lunini v. Grayeb, 
395 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2005) (civil action against police officers); Barstad v. Murray 
County, 420 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2005) (civil action against county and county zoning 
administrator); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(section 1983 action alleging that state water quality control board employees subjected 
them to selective and over-zealous regulatory oversight); but see Jennings v. City of 
Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tenth Circuit requiring proof of animus in a 
section 1983 civil action). Interestingly, each of these cases is a civil action challenging 
some type of "selective enforcement" decision, rather than a challenge to a prosecution. 
Many of these cases do not even involve enforcement under a statute or ordinance. 
Selective enforcement challenges are more properly brought in 
enforcement actions only, where there is no prosecution or where a regulation is 
challenged, not a criminal statute. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1139 (Utah 1994) 
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(recognizing that "[t]o permit police officers to use any minor traffic violation as a 
pretext to stop a vehicle encourages the selective enforcement of traffic regulations... 
."); but see State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Ut. App. 1988) (addressing allegation in 
criminal setting "that the prosecutor selectively enforced the bigamy statute and thereby 
violated Geerfs constitutional rights under the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution."). Here, Mr. Orvis Motion to Dismiss was a challenge only to the 
constitutionality of the decision of the City to prosecute him. 
In this case, Mr. Orvis does not get to choose whether his defense is based 
upon a "selective enforcement." This is a criminal prosecution for an admitted violation 
of a constitutional ordinance.5 [R. 353-61 (admitting violation)]. The Tenth Circuit has 
expressly held that when a criminal defendant challenges a prosecution under an 
otherwise constitutional statute, the enforcing officials are not subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. See United States v. Brookshire, 514 F.2d 786, 788-89 (10th Cir. 1975) ( 
holding that "selective enforcement is not in itself a constitutional violation). Thus, Mr. 
Orvis' constitutional defense is for "selective prosecution," and Judge Maetani applied 
the proper standard. 
5Under Geer, it should be evidently clear that a claim of selective prosecution is 
not a challenge to the constitutionality or validity of a statute or ordinance. 765 P.2d at 3. 
Rather, "[i]n the context of selective prosecution claims, in order to establish a prima 
facie case, thus shifting the burden to the State, the defendant must demonstrate that a 
prosecutorial policy results in a discriminatory effect, based on an unlawful 
classification." Id. (emphasis added). 
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IV. Mr. Orvis Was Not Subjected to Either Selective Enforcement or Selective 
Prosecution. 
As has been explained above, Judge Maetani applied the correct legal 
standard in this case. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 
L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). The Wayte court specifically held that: "It is appropriate to judge 
selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards. Under our 
prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both that the passive enforcement 
system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose." Id. "But the bare bones of the phrase 'intentional and purposeful 
discrimination' are an insufficient guide to judge liability... ." Leclair v. Saunders, 627 
F.2d 606, 609 (2d Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the Circuit Courts may adopt guidelines or 
tests to determine whether a passive enforcement system has a discriminatory effect and 
purpose. 
The Tenth Circuit has developed a test for determining when a passive 
enforcement system has both a discriminatory effect and is motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. Judge Maetani relied on this Tenth Circuit standard in his Conclusions of Law. 
The Tenth Circuit test for a "discriminatory effect or purpose" is found in U.S. v. 
Furman, 31 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1994).6 Furman states: 
6Contrary to the civil section 1983 cases which Mr. Orvis cites in his Appellant's 
brief, Furman is a criminal case where the Defendant properly raised selective 
prosecution as a defense. U.S. v. Furman, 31 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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In order to prevail on a claim of selective prosecution, a defendant must 
show that he has been singled out for prosecution while others similarly 
situated generally have not been proceeded against for the type of conduct 
forming the basis of the charge against him. [i.e. discriminatory effect] In 
addition, the defendant must prove that the government's selection of him 
for prosecution was invidious or in bad faith and was based on 
impermissible considerations such as the desire to prevent the exercise of 
constitutional rights, [i.e. motivated by discriminatory purpose]. 
Id. (internal marks and citations omitted); see United States v. Davis, 339 F.3d 1223 at n. 
3 (10th Cir. 2003). 
Similarly, the Utah law most directly on point holds that in analyzing a 
"selective prosecution" claim the court should look to: 
The elements of a prima facie case under an equal protection claim.. . 
consisted of identifying the group to which the defendant belonged and 
demonstrating that the identified group was treated disparately under the 
laws as written or applied. In the context of selective prosecution claims, 
in order to establish a prima facie case . . . the defendant must demonstrate 
that a prosecutorial policy results in a discriminatory effect, based on an 
unlawful classification. 
State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Ut. App. 1988) (internal marks and quotations omitted). 
While the City will continue to cite Utah law where applicable, it should be noted that 
Mr. Orvis relies mainly on federal law in making his arguments, and does not provide 
any substantive analysis of his claim under the Utah Constitution, nor urge a different 
result under the Utah Constitution. Thus, this Court should confine its analysis to the 
federal constitution. See South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 2002 UT App 405 at n. 5; 
State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 at n. 1 (Ut. App. 1998). 
Meeting the applicable Tenth Circuit standard is very tough for a criminal 
-21-
defendant alleging selective prosecution. This is because: 
Prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining whether to prosecute. 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 
L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). As long as the prosecutor has probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed, the decision regarding whether 
to prosecute "generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion." 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 
(1978). Although selective prosecution claims are assessed according to 
"ordinary equal protection standards," the decision to prosecute may not be 
"deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531. 
Geer, 765 P.2d at 3; see U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp.2d 541, 564 (E. D. Va. 2002) 
(holding that "the Constitution clearly confers broad prosecutorial discretion...."). 
Again, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has made clear that 'the conscious exercise of 
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." 
Geaneas v. Willets, 715 F.Supp. 334, 340 (M. D. Fla. 1989) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448 (1962)); see United States v. Brookshire, 514 F.2d 786, 788-89 (10th Cir. 1975) 
(quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962)).7 
7The Oregon Supreme court provided applicable insight into why the prosecutorial 
and enforcement discretion of state or municipal officials is given such latitude, even if 
those officials are lax and selective in their enforcement. The court stated: 
We do find that there has been laxity in the enforcement of the . . . Law but 
mere laxity is not and cannot be held to be a denial of the equal protection 
of the law. If the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to 
some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with 
crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for 
nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged 
with [] crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete 
breakdown. 
State v. Hicks, 213 Or. 619, 325 P.2d 794, 802 (Or. 1958). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that an allegation of selective 
enforcement or selective prosecution is a tough allegation to prove. For example, in 
Herman v. State, the Utah Supreme court dealt squarely with the claim that an enforcing 
officials discretion may amount to "selective enforcement." 821 P.2d 457, 458 (Utah 
1991). The Utah Supreme court stated that even proof of being tried, convicted, and 
sentenced while others who committed the same crime went unpunished "does not show 
a violation of plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of the law." Id. "At best, the 
argument would show only laxity in enforcement of the law. But laxity in enforcement 
of the law with respect to others is not a defense to enforcement of the law against 
plaintiffs." Id. (citing similar case law from sister states). 
As Judge Maetani correctly recognized: 
[F]ederal courts have held that a defendant asserting selective prosecution 
bears the 'heavy burden5 of establishing a prima facie case before they are 
even entitled to receive an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bustamante, 805 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1986). Mere conjecture does not 
meet the rigorous standard. See United States v. Furman, 31 F.3d 1034, 
1037 (10th Cir. 1994) (district court did not [abuse] its discretion in 
dismissing claim of selective prosecution based on 'conclusory 
allegations.'). 
Judge Maetani's Conclusions of Law at pages 5-6 [R. 390-91]. Against this backdrop, 
the following analysis of the facts of this case show that Judge Maetani was completely 
correct in finding that Mr. Orvis was not subjected to selective prosecution and thus, his 
ruling should be affirmed by this court. 
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A. Mr. Orvis Has Failed to Sufficiently Allege That He Was Singled out 
for Prosecution While Others Similarly Situated Generally Have Not 
Been Proceeded Against for the Type of Conduct Forming the Basis of 
the Charge. 
There is not sufficient factual allegations in this case for this Court to 
determine that Judge Maetani was incorrect in finding that Mr. Orvis was not singled out 
for prosecution. Contrarily, the facts as admitted by Mr. Orvis actually support the 
proposition that Mr. Orvis and others have been charged similarly. [R. 322-45]. The 
Record, pages 322 to 345 are all evidence of prosecutions or citations similar to that 
received by Mr. Orvis. Addendum Tab 2. 
In order to prove that one has been treated disparately, or singled out for 
prosecution, the defendant must meet the heavy burden of "establishing that the [City] 
has a prosecutorial policy in regard to [people operating businesses without licenses] 
which produces an unlawful discriminatory effect." State v. Greer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Ut. 
App. 1988). Mr. Orvis has failed to do this. In fact, Mr. Orvis presented no evidence 
regarding any prosecutorial policy. Simply put, Mr. Orvis violated the City ordinance. 
For example, Mr. Orvis admits that "the City began actively citing and 
prosecuting individuals for doing business without a license...." Appellant's Brief at n. 
14.8 This admission is fatal on its face to a claim of selective enforcement or selective 
8It matters not in a selective enforcement action if Mr. Orvis was the first to be 
prosecuted. See U.S. v. McCord, 695 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir.1983). Theoretically, someone must 
always be the first to be prosecuted. Mr. Orvis presents no evidence indicating he was the first to 
be prosecuted, and he readily admits others were prosecuted. See Appellant's Brief at n. 14; [R. 
322-45; Addendum Tab 2.]. 
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prosecution. Certainly, Mr. Orvis was not a "class of one" with regards to prosecutorial 
decision making. This admission also makes it readily apparent that others similarly 
situated with Mr. Orvis, i.e. that operate a business without a business license, are 
prosecuted. Mr. Orvis attempts to create a very broad class of persons who failed to 
come into compliance with the City's July 19, 2001 letter. However, the facts are 
undisputed that of the almost 300 persons sent that letter, only one person did not come 
into compliance and also blatantly submitted a falsified and/or incorrect business license 
application, was Mr. Orvis. Although Mr. Orvis was not prosecuted for submitting a 
falsified and/or incorrect business license, his case and the facts which were analyzed 
thereunder by the City enforcing officials, presented a situation dissimilar to anyone else. 
No one was similarly situated with Mr. Orvis, yet others have been prosecuted. 
This court has previously recognized in an unpublished opinion that "[i]n 
light of the relatively small sample size - - two other inmates - - . . . the trial court did not 
find Defendant's evidence credible." State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 306 at page 2 (a 
copy of this opinion is attached as "Exh. B."). Similarly, here there were only one or two 
people who submitted incorrect business license applications. Furthermore, Mr. Orvis 
presents no evidence that any other applicant misrepresented facts on their business 
license application as he did. Accordingly, the sample size of the class which Mr. Orvis 
claims to be a part of is simply too small to indicate whether similarly situated people 
were not prosecuted. In other words, if any other business had blatantly misrepresented 
-25-
facts on their business license application, they would have likely also been prosecuted. 
However, this is impossible to know, because Mr. Orvis was the only business owner 
situated as such. 
Further example that Mr. Orvis5 situation was dissimilar to any other 
person who did not obtain a business license in the City comes from the fact that Mr. 
Orvis declined to allow the City to inspect his business on September 24, 2001. See 
Appellant's Brief at 17-18. Inspections of businesses which apply for a business license 
in the City are allowed by ordinance. See Pleasant Grove Municipal Ordinance § 
5.04.200 [R. 85]. Specifically, the City allows that "officers shall be permitted to make 
an inspection to enforce any of the provisions of this Title or any other applicable statute 
or ordinance, and may enter any building or may enter any premises...." Id. While 
these inspections may have been unusual, or not common, the City was not usually faced 
with an applicant for a business license which blatantly misrepresented the nature of their 
business on their business license application. Here, Mr. Orvis presents no evidence 
stating that other business were not inspected. He also presents no evidence of any 
official policy or custom of "selectively enforcing" the applicable ordinances, which do 
allow inspections. 
Mr. Orvis presents the Court with the fact that it was unusual for the City to 
inspect a premises simply for a business license application. [R. 500, p. 222]. This fact 
does not create a discriminatory effect nor disparate treatment. For example, in Geer, 
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this Court was presented with an affidavit stating that the County Attorney had never 
been requested to file charges of bigamy, except against Mr. Geer. 765 P.2d at 3. The 
Court found that there was no discriminatory policy, but that rather the County Attorney 
based his decision on whether "there was sufficient evidence to convict...." Id. at 4. 
"Geer was not treated any differently from any other bigamist." Id. Similarly, Mr. Orvis 
was not treated any differently than any other business owner that: 1) failed to come into 
compliance with the City's business license ordinance after being requested to do so in 
the July 2001 letter, 2) misrepresented the nature of his business on the business license 
application, and 3) failed to allow an inspection of his business after being requested to 
do so in an attempt by the City to discern the exact nature of Mr. Orvis' business. In fact, 
many others have been prosecuted in much less egregious situations. See [R. 322-45]. 
Each of these facts creates the situation which was known to the prosecutor 
and the City enforcing officials, who are burdened with making the prosecutorial 
decision of whether to charge Mr. Orvis. The violation of the City ordinance by Mr. 
Orvis had been longstanding and flagrant. A City can take those factors into account 
when making a prosecutorial or enforcement decision. See Geaneas v. Willets, 715 
F.Supp. 334, 340 (M. D. Fla. 1989) (holding that there was no evidence of anything 
other than an attempt to effectuate the intent of the Ordinance where "the City has 
indicated that it chose to enforce the Ordinance , . . because the violations of the 
Ordinance . . . have been longstanding and flagrant."). 
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Mr Orvis admits that his violation of Pleasant Grove Municipal Code 
Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) had been longstanding and flagrant. For example, the 
following comes from Mr. Orvis' deposition in his civil matter, which was properly 
presented to Judge Maetani: 
Q: So there was no doubt, and I'll repeat the question, no doubt in your 
mind that you should have had a business license during the 
pertinent years? 
A: There was no doubt in my mind that I should have had one 
Q: And in fact, you didn't even apply for one until August of 2001, 
isn't that true? 
A: Did not apply is true. 
Deposition of Vic Orvis [R. 357]. 
Mr. Orvis also admits he was aware of the difference between a major 
a minor home occupation permit, and in fact misrepresented his business on his 
application to the City: 
Q: There's a difference in content between the two [major and minor 
occupation permits], isn't there? 
A: Yes, there is a major and a minor. They allow different things. 
Q: Didn't say anything about the shop in the first application, did you? 
A: Did not. 
Q: And you did in the second one when you went for a major home 
occupation permit, true? 
A: In the first application I was willing, in order to expedite the request 
for a business license, to limit my function to exclude the shop[.] . . . 
Q: When they showed up in September of 2001, and Officer Taufer 
saw the shop, you were still fabricating in there, weren't you? 
A: We were [fabricating] a prototype. 
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Q: You made the application for [only] the home office in August, a 
month before, didn't you? 
A: Well, actually,.... no one came over and talked to me and said 
okay, this is a minor application, would you be willing to restrict 
your activities to this level,. . . you know. 
Deposition of Vic Orvis [R. 355-56]. 
Mr. Orvis admits that he knew he was engaged in a major home occupation 
business. He admits he applied for a business license for the first time after receiving the 
City's letter, but after the date requested therein. He admits he applied for only a minor 
home occupation permit, but that he still continued to engage in major home occupation 
type business. Accordingly, Mr. Orvis blatantly and flagrantly violated Pleasant Grove 
Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000) for at least a period of three years. It is 
apparent that Mr. Orvis was not similarly situated with any of the other "300" on the list 
because there is no evidence any of them blatantly misstated their business on their 
business license application and then continued to conduct such business. It matters not 
that Mr. Orvis was cited and prosecuted for activity that occurred before, as the decision 
to prosecute was based both on longstanding and on continuing flagrant violations of the 
City ordinance. Accordingly, Mr. Orvis has failed to meet the first threshold requirement 
for a claim of selective enforcement (prosecution). 
B. Mr. Orvis Has Failed to Prove That the City's Selection of Him for 
Prosecution Was Invidious or in Bad Faith and Was Based on 
Impermissible Considerations Such as the Desire to Prevent the 
Exercise of Constitutional Rights, 
The second threshold requirement which Mr. Orvis must prove in order to 
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successfully claim selective prosecution requires that he prove the City's selection was 
invidious or made in bad faith in a desire to prevent Mr. Orvis from the exercise of any 
constitutional right U.S. v. Furman, 31 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1994). Here, the sole 
purpose of the City's prosecution of Mr. Orvis was his failure to comply with Pleasant 
Grove Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 (2000). See State v. Lee, 558 P.2d 236, 239 
(Wash. 1977) (holding that appellant could not prove he was selected for any 
unjustifiable standard, but rather was selected because he clearly met the requirements 
necessary to violate the statute, and thus, the statute does not deny appellant equal 
protection of the law). 
On appeal and at the district court level, Mr. Orvis has not alleged that he 
was singled out for prosecution because of either race or religion. Furthermore, he does 
not allege that the City prosecuted him with the desire to prevent his exercise of 
constitutional rights. Rather, Mr. Orvis alleges that: "The City's selective treatment of 
Mr. Orvis was motivated by the City's animosity toward him for the political views he 
expressed while a member of the City's Planning Commission." Appellant's Brief at 19 
(alterations from initial capitalization in original). This allegation fails to meet the 
requisite standard, and thus Mr. Orvis' was not selectively prosecuted. 
Mr. Orvis relies on the case ofMimics, Inc., v. Village of Angel Fire, for 
the proposition that the City's treatment of him was a campaign of official harassment 
"motivated by political spite." 394 F.3d 836, 849 (10th Cir. 2005); Appellant's Brief at 
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38. However, Mimics does not involve a criminal prosecution. Id. Rather it is a section 
1983 civil claim. Id. In fact, Mimics does not even involve a statute or ordinance. Id. 
Mimics involves persecution, not prosecution. Id. The cases cited in Mimics, 
specifically Village ofWillowbrook v. Olech, and Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Sch., do not 
involve criminal prosecutions, but rather are section 1983 civil actions. Id. Simply put, 
Mimics is inapplicable to this fact pattern. A city's animosity towards a business owner 
is not the type of conduct which deprives one of the right to exercise his constitutional 
rights. 
Since Mr. Orvis has not alleged any inability to exercise his constitutional 
rights based on the City's prosecution, he has clearly failed to meet the second threshold 
requirement for a claim of selective prosecution.9 Mr. Orvis did not suffer any 
constitutional deprivations, and has not been prevented from exercising any 
constitutional rights. Accordingly, Mr. Orvis cannot be successful on a claim for 
selective enforcement and/or selective prosecution. 
furthermore, Mr. Orvis squarely addressed any allegations that he suffered 
constitutional deprivations in his federal section 1983 case, and was summarily rejected 
by the Honorable Judge Stewart. See Exh. A. (ordering "that Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment... is GRANTED on the Equal Protection, substantive due process, 
procedural due process, and conspiracy claims."). Judge Stewart ordered "the clerk of 
the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of [the City] on all claims and close this 
case." Id. 
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V* Judge Maetani's Findings of Fact Are Not Subject to Appellate Review, and 
Even If So, They Are Readily Appropriate. 
This Court specifically indicated that the only issue on appeal would 
involve "the constitutionality of [Pleasant Grove Municipal Code Chapter 5.04 § 030 
(2000)] as applied to [Mr. Orvis]."10 Accordingly, this Court need not address Judge 
Maetani's Findings of Fact 
However, should this Court desire to engage in an analysis of Judge 
Maetani's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it will find that they are completely 
appropriate. For example, Mr. Orvis suggests that Judge Maetani did not "disclose the 
steps by which [he] reached [his] decision." Appellant's Brief at 44. However, Judge 
Maetani begins his Findings of Fact by stating: "The above entitled matter came before 
the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Motion to Suppress.... 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, having heard and considered the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law[.]" [R. 395]. Judge Maetani clearly discloses 
how he reached his decisions. Furthermore, the fact that Judge Maetani mentions he 
heard arguments from counsel, testimony from witnesses, and was fully advised in the 
premise, necessarily indicates he did not summarily adopt the City's proposed findings of 
fact. Because Judge Maetani chose to adopt each of the City's proposed findings of fact 
'Although no unconstitutional ordinance was "applied" to Mr. Orvis. 
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does not mean he was uneducated on the facts or arguments of the case. Rather, it means 
that he fully agreed with the City as to each of the proposed findings and conclusions of 
law. The City would also note, that Judge Stewart, who also was fully advised and 
educated on the facts of Mr. Orvis' situation and on the applicable standards and law also 
decided to adopt Judge Maetani's findings of fact res judicata. See Exh. A. 
The facts of this case support each of Judge Maetani's findings. Mr. Orvis 
presents a technical argument regarding why this Court should apply a less deferential 
standard to Judge Maetani's findings, but really does not address why the findings are at 
all inappropriate. Mr. Orvis does fleetingly mention that: 
[T]he district court made no factual finding relative to: (1) the group of 
people, if any, who were similarly situated with Mr. Orvis; (2) whether Mr. 
Orvis was treated differently than those similarly situated; (3) whether the 
City's disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis was intentional; (4) whether the 
City had a rational basis to treat Mr. Orvis differently; or (5) whether the 
City's disparate treatment was motivated by animus or ill-will. These 
findings were necessary to disclose the steps by which the district court 
reached its conclusion. 
Appellant's Brief at 48. Judge Maetani did not grant Mr. Orvis' Motion to Dismiss. 
Thus, it follows that as Judge Maetani heard the testimony, the arguments of counsel, and 
read the briefing of counsel, there was no disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis. A district 
court judge need not make findings which are irrelevant to his decision. 
Furthermore, as was fully briefed above, the standard applicable to Mr. 
Orvis constitutional defense of selective prosecution did not involve animus or ill-will. 
Thus, any findings regarding animus or ill-will would have been improper. Judge 
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Maetani fully and completely disclosed the steps by which he reached his decision. In 
fact, many of the findings which Judge Maetani makes aire based on Mr. Orvis' 
admissions. For example: 
Finding No. 1 is admitted by Mr. Orvis at Appellant's Brief page 6. 
Finding No. 2 details the process through which the City notified some 300 
people they were not in compliance with City code, and that at some point after a second 
notification all but two people, one of which was Mr. Orvis, had failed to come into 
compliance with the ordinance. Coming into compliance with the Ordinance could 
include properly applying for a license, without misrepresentations, but not yet having 
received the license. Thus, Mr. Orvis' statement that "[a]t the time Mr. Orvis was 
criminally prosecuted at least 5 other people on the list of 300 had not yet applied for 
and/or received a license[]" is irrelevant. See Appellant's Brief at 13. 
Finding No. 3 is admitted by Mr. Orvis. See [R. 357]. 
Finding No. 4 is admitted by Mr. Orvis. See [R. 355]. "[I]n order to 
expedite the request for a business license, to limit my function to exclude the shop, and 
just, you know, do things within the home on the drafting table and in the computer." [R. 
355]. Mr. Orvis then admits he was doing a protype, or major home occupation type 
work, in September of 2001 after he applied for the minor home occupation permit only. 
[R. 355]. 
Finding No. 5 is certainly discernable from the record, for the same reason 
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as described in Finding 4. [R. 355]. 
Finding No. 6 is admitted by Mr. Orvis. [R. 355]. 
Finding No. 7 is admitted by Mr. Taufer, but is irrelevant to selective 
enforcement. [R. 243]. 
Finding No. 8 is admitted by Mr. Taufer, but is irrelevant to selective 
enforcement. [R. 243]. 
Finding No. 9 is admitted by Mr. Taufer, but is irrelevant to selective 
enforcement. [R. 243]. 
Finding No. 10 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 243 affidavit of Jim Taufer 
generally]. 
Finding No. 11 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 243 affidavit of Jim Taufer 
generally]. 
Finding No. 12 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 243 affidavit of Jim Taufer 
generally]. 
Finding No. 13 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 243 affidavit of Jim Taufer 
generally]. 
Finding No. 14 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 243 affidavit of Jim Taufer 
generally]. 
Finding No. 15 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 243 affidavit of Jim Taufer 
generally]. 
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Finding No. 16 is admitted by Mr. Taufer. [R. 243 affidavit of Jim Taufer 
generally]. This finding is also evidenced in each of the findings made above. 
Clearly each of the above findings of fact is supported by the record that 
was before Judge Maetani, and that is before this Court on appeal. Furthermore, given 
these factual findings, it was wholly appropriate for Judge Maetani to make the 
conclusions of law which he did. That includes finding that Mr. Orvis was not subject to 
selective prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the City respectfully requests that this Court 
dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
In the alternative, the City respectfully requests that this Court affirm Judge 
Maetani's denial of Mr. Orvis5 Motion to Dismiss based on selective enforcement 
(prosecution) and affirm the guilty verdict rendered against Mr. Orvis. 
DATED this / f day of February, 2006. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
PETER STIRBA 
MEB W. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Pleasant Grove City 
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p. 11 
1 MR. STIRBA: Back on the record. 
2 Q. My question to you Mr. Orvds was, when did you 
3 actually start doing business at the Center Street 
4 location as Design Fabricators? 
5 I A, Doing fabrication or just keeping records? 
6 Q. Why don't you tell me both. 
7 A. Keeping records probably started mid to end of 
8 '96. 
9 Q. How about fabrication? 
10 A. Most fabrication was done off site by others. 
11 Q. My question is, when did it start though? 
12 A I have no idea On-site ex off-site? 
13 Q. On-site. 
14 A. I'd have to look and see if there was prototype 
15 v/e did on-site. I don't know. 
16 Q. Well « 
17 A. Or try and recall. I don!t recall. 
18 Q. You admit, do you not, that you've done 
19 I fabrication work at the Pleasant Grove location? 
20 J A. We have done some prototype fabrication at the 
21 J Pleasant Grove. 
22 Q. And you admit that that fabrication or 
23 I prototype work is done in that shed, which is adjacent 
24 | to the residence, right? 
25 \ A. Some of it was done there, yes. 
22 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
1 J Q* Essentially you have an out building, shop or 
2 J shed adjacent to the residence? 
3 A. Yes, a kind interpretation of it. 
4 Q. In there is where this fabrication, as we're 
5 described it, would occur; is that correct? 
6 A. Some of it, yes. 
7 Q. Now, that some that you are referring to, can 
8 you tell me if you did any cf that fabrication work in 
9 '97? 
10 A. Probably. 
11 Q. '98? 
12 A. Probably. 
13 Q. '99? 
14 A. Probably. 
15 Q. I assume it's ongoing through todayr is that a 
16 fair statement? 
17 A. No, it's not. There was a 15 to 18 month 
18 hiatus. 
19 Q. Other than the hiatus-, but continuously? 
20 A- Actually, this situation with Pleasant Grove 
21 I has actively destroyed that fabrication business. 
22 Q. Let1s go back. 
23 J A. Let's say that when I was told by police office 
24 I Taufer on whatever date the record shows, to cease and 
25 I desist doing business, I have not picked that business 
23 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
p. 13 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
up in any meaningful way since then, mostly because 
I've lost my customers. 
Q. Okay. So at least continuously through 
September of 2001, you did some fabrication work in 
that shed or shop adjacent to the residence; is that 
correct? 
A. Some prototype development work. 
Q. When you say prototype development, tell me how 
you are defining that? 
A. Well, when you have an idea, even if it's a 
little widget or big truss boom, you typically sketch 
it up and draw it up either on a computer or a drafting 
13 table. And I use a drafting table, and you build 
something that looks like it to see iE it works. 
That's a prototype. 
Q. Then you take that prototype and you fabricate 
that out of metal? 
A. Take it to somebody and have it fabricated. 
Q. The fabrication work that was done in the shed, 
was essentially the fabrication of prototypes? 
A. Typically, yes. 
Q. Did you have any employees in 1996 here in 
Utah? 
A. I may have had one or two of my children 
helping me on occasion, but no, I had no full time 
24 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
I A. No. 
2 | Q. And is there any doubt in your mind that you 
3 should have had a city business license to conduct 
4 business in the city? 
5 A. I needed a business license, and if you go_ 
6 through the codes it was a very difficult, if not 
7 I impossible thing to get, the business license. The 
8 zone I'm in is commercial- The home occupation 
9 I licenses are stated for residential, and so it created 
10 I a problem which I tried to fix with the Planning 
II J Commission of the business licenses for those homes, 
12 which there are hundreds in the commercial and 
13 manufacturing areas. 
14 Q. So there wag no doubt, and I'll repeat the 
15 question, no doubt in your mind that you should have 
16 had a business license during the pertinent years? 
17 A. There was no doubt in my mind I should have had 
18 one and no doubt in my mind that one wasn't within the 
19 I code available. 
20 J Q. And in fact, you didn't even apply for one 
21 until August of 2001, isn't that true? 
22 A. - Did not apply is true. Had discussions with 
23 and started the approval process, and had discussions 
24 J with city employees prior to when I did fully apply for 
25 I a minor home occupation. I did two different 
78 
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p. 15 
1 license application would be processed within a few 
2 days. 
3 I Did you bring any documents with you responsive to 
4 that request? 
5 A. Can I have that-? 
6 Q. The binder, Exhibit 7, certainly. 
7 A. The application section of the binder, there19 
8 a Xerox copy of the application that I made for that 
9 business license. We need to keep in mind I've made 
10 two applications, one for a minor home occupation 
11 J license and when that was not acted upon for several 
12 months, then I made application for a major home 
13 occupation license, because I knew that that had to go 
14 before the Planning Commission, And so there's two 
15 applications here. 
16 Q. There's a difference in content between the 
17 two, isn't there? 
18 A. Yes, there is major and minor. They allow 
19 different things. 
20 1 Q. Didn't say anything about the shop in the first 
21 application, did you? 
22 A. Did,not. 
23 Q- And you did in the second one when you went for 
24 I a major home occupation permit, true? 
25 I A. In the first application 1 was willing, in 
103 
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1 order to expedite the request for a business license, 
2 to limit my function to exclude the shop, and just, you 
3 know, do things within the hone on the drafting table 
4 and in the computer. Part of what I did was a 
5 consulting sort of thing and that would not have 
6 I interfered with that. And the other part was to design 
7 something and have it shopped out and done and 
8 J completed. 
9 1 Q, When they showed up in September of 2001, and 
10 Officer Taufer saw the shop, you were still fabricating 
11 in there, werenft you? 
12 A, We were doing a prototype 
13 Q, You made the application for the home office in 
14 August, a month before, didn't you? 
15 A, Well, actually, in fact if that had been 
16 approved it was just pocket vetoed, it was never 
17 approved or disapproved, wasn't denied or accepted. It 
18 was sat on for whatever reasons that we some day will 
19 understand, I suppose. So no one came over and talked 
20 to me and said okay, this is a minor application, would 
21 J you be willing to restrict your activities to this 
22 1 level, which I would have been, you know. So in a 
23 J sense they asked me to apply, I applied, and they 
24 didn't act on it for over a year. 
25 I So\ you know, in other words that was a defacto way 
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1 draft and things like that. 
2 Q. So tell me why then in May of 200}., given the 
3 nature of the business that you were engaged in at that 
4 time, which was, as you just described it, did you 
5 apply -- did you believe it was appropriate for you to 
6 apply for a minor home occupation business license? 
7 A. I was — I went and said Let's --to the City, 
8 they sent me a letter, which you're aware of, that said 
9 here we've got these people that have resale licenses 
10 that have not applied for business licenses, please come 
11 and rectify that. So I came in, I believe even before I 
12 came in, had the discussion on the phone, major, minor, 
13 what do we do? It doesn't fit in the code at all. It 
14 still doesn't fit in the code. 
15 And so then I came in and said well, let's start 
16 with a minor because I knew it would take time to go to 
17 the Planning Commission to get a major. That requires a 
18 public hearing, and therefore, time, so let's start with 
19 the minor and I'll restrict my activities to those, you 
20 J know, outsource all of the prototype development and 
21 we'll do the minor thing until we get to the Planning 
22 Commission and see what they will and will not 
23 conditionally approve. 
24 Q, Isn't it true that as of August of 2001, the 
25 J business activity for Design Fabricators was a major 
177 
1 home occupation business? 
2 I A. The type of activity could be construed as a 
3 major home occupation, 
4 Q. That's true, isn't it, as of August of 2001? 
5 A. Yes, I'd say that's probably true. 
6 Q. And certainly you could have, as of August of 
7 2001, if you were so inclined, made application for a 
8 major home occupation license; isn't that true? 
9 A. I could have made application for either 
10 depending on how I was willing to restrict my activity 
11 or not restrict them, 
12 Q, Here's 22. This is the Home Occupation Permit, 
13 once again, I think this is, if you'll turn to the 
14 second page, it's dated 5/1/2002. That's your 
15 signature, correct? 
16 A* That is my signature. 
17 Q. And once again, you filled in the information 
18 on this permit; is that true? 
19 A- It is. 
20 Q. And you certainly, when you filled it in, you 
21 1 intended it to be true and accurate, correct? 
22 A- The upper portion I did not fill in. 
23 Q. I'm sorry? 
24 A. The date, the zone, the fee circle, the upper 
25 I third of the first page I did not fill in. 
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IN THE PLEASANT GROVE JUSTICE COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, 
Plaintift | 
Vs. 
Natalie Holdaway 
690 W. State 
Pleasant Grove, UTS4062 ! 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
Case No: 
Admin. Citation # 
Judge Brent Bullock 
The undersigned, Bret B. Hkken, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I 
OPERATING A BUSINESS WITHOUT A BUSINESS LICENSE, a Class *B" Misdemeanor, 
in Pleasant Grove City, Utah County, in violation of Section 3-1-3 of the Pleasant Grove 
Municipal Code, in that the defendant did engage in a business, trade, profession or calling within 
the corporate limits of the City without renewing the business license before the expiration date" 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: Officer Limb. 
Date: May 2003 
BretRHicken 
Pleasant Grove City Prosecutor 
Page 1 Of 1 Rt^m^CrfndtMl^onn^r^ 
IN THE PLEASANT GROVE JUSTICE COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
Kevin Skelton 
665 S. Locust 
Pleasant Grove, DT 84062 
ooe^M^ 
INFORMATION 
Case No: 
Admin. Citation # 
Judge Brent Bullock 
Defendant 
The undersigned, Bret B* Hicken, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I 
OPERATING A BUSINESS WITHOUT A BUSINESS LICENSE, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, 
in Pleasant Grove City, Utah County, in violation of Section 3-1-3 of the Pleasant Grove 
Municipal Code, in that the defendant did engage in a business, trade, profession or calling within 
the corporate limits of the City without renewing the business license before the expiration date. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: Officer Limb. 
Pate: May 2 ^ 2 0 0 3 
Pleasant Grove City Prosecutor 
Page 1 of I m^pnuuratnofr^ 
IN THE PLEASANT GROVE JUSTICE COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PLEASANT GROVE CTTY, 
Plaintiff; 
Vs. 
Terry White 
728 W. 1160 N. 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
f)D0''/*/33/5/ 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
Case No: 
Admin. Citation # 
Judge Brent Bullock 
The undersigned, Bret B. Hicken, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I 
OPERATING A BUSINESS WITHOUT A BUSINESS LICENSE, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, 
in Pleasant Grove City, Utah County, in violation of Section 3-1-3 of the Pleasant Grove 
Municipal Code, in that the defendant did engage in a business, trade, profession or calling within 
the corporate limits of the City without renewing the business license before the expiration date. 
(ft buwfatt^&k-
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: Officer Limb. 
Date: May ' T , 2003 ^ 
UltX B^Mcken 
Pleasant Grove City Prosecutor 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
VICTOR ORVIS and DESIGN 
FABRICATORS, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, EDWARD T. 
SANDERSON, CAROL HARMER, 
BETTY MEMMOTT, DAROLD McDADE, 
JIM DANKLEF, MARK ATWOOD, KEITH 
CORRY, TINA PETERSEN, individually 
and in her capacity as Pleasant Grove 
City Attorney, STAN KLEMETSON, JIM 
TAUFER, and FRANK MILLS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, AND DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 2:03-CV-430 TS 
This matter came before the court on June 13, 2005, for hearing on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Selective 
Enforcement Claim Based Upon the Doctrine of Federal Abstention, and Plaintiffs' Motion 
1 
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for Partial Summary Judgment. The court has considered the Motions, Responses and 
Replies and all related materials. Defendants' counsel appeared at the hearing. Plaintiffs' 
counsel did not appear. The court made its findings and conclusions of record at the 
hearing. For those reasons stated at the hearing, it is therefore 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Selective Enforcement 
Claim Based Upon the Doctrine of Federal Abstention (Docket No. 65) is DENIED. It is 
further 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 35) on 
Plaintiffs' state law claims for intentional interference with economic relations, trespass, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED. It is further 
ORDERED that, having determined that res judicata applies, the court will rely on 
the Findings of Fact made by the Utah State District Court for the purposes of the present 
Motions. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 74) is 
DENIED. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 35) is 
GRANTED on the Equal Protection, substantive due process, procedural due process, and 
conspiracy claims. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 35) on 
qualified immunity grounds is MOOT. It is further 
ORDERED that, the court having granted summary judgment in favor of the 
individual defendants on all claims, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket 
2 
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No. 35) is GRANTED as to all claims against Defendant City of Pleasant Grove. It is 
further 
ORDERED that all claims being resolved, the clerk of court is directed to enter 
judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims and close this case. 
DATED July 26, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
T£D STEWART 
UniteCTStates District Judge 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT whom Defendant compared himself were 
RULES BEFORE CITING. prosecuted, but were offered plea deals by 
the State. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Orrin Bruce WALLACE, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20040237-CA. 
June 30, 2005. 
Fifth District, St. George Department, 031500641; 
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham. 
Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, GREENWOOD, and 
JACKSON. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
*1 Defendant Orrin Bruce Wallace appeals his 
conviction of assault by a prisoner, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-
102.5. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (2003). 
We affirm. 
Defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective 
by failing to file or pursue Defendant's claim that 
the State was selectively prosecuting him on the 
basis of his race. [FN1] 
FN1. Actually, Defendant's accusations are 
better characterized as selective plea 
bargaining. According to Defendant's 
affidavits, both of the fellow inmates to 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, " 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that 
but for counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.' " 
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,1 20, 94 P.3d 211 
(quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 12,% 19, 
61 P.3d 978) (additional citation omitted); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 
. "In making this evaluation, the court must 'indulge 
in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.1 " Myers, 2004 UT 
31 at % 20 (quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990)) (additional quotations and 
citations omitted). 
First, the performance of Defendant's trial counsel 
was not "below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Id. For instance, Defendant's trial 
counsel apparently advised Defendant that his 
selective-prosecution claim did not square with her 
trial strategy. Counsel's failure to raise a claim may 
be presumptively sound trial strategy. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993) (noting an 
act that "might be considered sound trial strategy" 
does not demonstrate inadequacy of counsel); see 
also Myers, 2004 UT 31 at % 20 (presuming trial 
counsel's action was "sound trial strategy" 
(quotations and citations omitted)). In addition, 
Defendant's pro se motion explicitly stated that he 
was pursuing the selective-prosecution action 
"without the assistance of counsel." 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Moreover, Defendant was not prejudiced by his 
trial counsel's failure to pursue the 
selective-prosecution claim. Indeed, the trial court, 
affording procedural leniency to Defendant, 
allowed Defendant to file his first motion and 
affidavit at the conclusion of his trial, 
notwithstanding the State's objection. Nonetheless, 
the trial court chose not to rule on either of 
Defendant's motions. Further, the trial court did not 
err by not considering Defendant's motions or 
allowing Defendant further discovery because, as 
presented, those motions were insufficient. 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has 
opined on the heavy burden of such a claim: 
A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on 
the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an 
independent assertion that the prosecutor has 
brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the 
Constitution. Our cases delineating the necessary 
elements to prove a claim of selective prosecution 
have taken great pains to explain that the standard 
is a demanding one. These cases afford a 
background presumption that the showing 
necessary to obtain discovery should itself be a 
significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial 
claims. 
*2 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 
463-64 (1996) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
This court also addressed selective-prosecution 
claims in State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988). In Geer, we noted, "Prosecutors are 
given broad discretion in determining whether to 
prosecute." Id. at 3 (citing Wayte v. United States, 
470 U .S. 598, 607 (1985)). "As long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an 
offense has been committed, the decision regarding 
whether to prosecute 'generally rests entirely in [the 
prosecutor's] discretion.' " Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
364 (1978)). "Although selective prosecution 
claims are assessed according to 'ordinary equal 
protection standards,' the decision to prosecute may 
not be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable 
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.' " Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 
608). As here, "a defendant who seeks discovery on 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 2 
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a claim of selective prosecution must show some 
evidence of both discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory intent." United States v. Bass, 536 
U.S. 862, 863 (2002). To show discriminatory 
effect, "the defendant must make a 'credible 
showing' that 'similarly situated individuals of a 
different race were not prosecuted.' " Id. (quoting 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 470). 
Here, Defendant's only evidence of the prosecutor's 
alleged deliberate racial bias consisted of his two 
affidavits, the first of which did not identify the race 
of Defendant's example of a similarly situated 
inmate. In light of the small sample size-two other 
inmates—and self-serving nature of Defendant's 
affidavits, the trial court did not find Defendant's 
evidence credible. Indeed, Defendant's self-serving 
affidavits are insufficient to overcome the 
presumption that the prosecutor acted without bias. 
See United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 
(6th Cir.1990) (upholding district court's conclusion 
that the defendant's self-serving affidavit and an 
affidavit from his counsel did not support his 
selective-prosecution claim); cf. State v. Gutierrez, 
2003 UT App 95,H 10, 68 P.3d 1035 (ruling a 
self-serving "affidavit, by itself, is insufficient to 
invalidate a prior conviction"). 
Because we determine that Defendant's 
selective-prosecution claim is without merit, 
Defendant's trial counsel's failure to pursue it did 
not prejudice Defendant. See State v. Kelley, 2000 
UT 41,U 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile 
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel."); see also Truesdale v. Moore, 142 
F.3d 749, 755 (4th Cir.1998) ( "It was not 
constitutionally ineffective assistance for [the 
defendant's] resentencing counsel not to pursue 
futile claims."). Under such a conclusion, 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
fails. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling. 
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding 
Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge. 
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